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Searching for Limits on a Municipality's Retention of
Governmental Immunity: Lyles v. City of Charlotte
On August 5, 1990, a Charlotte police officer, Milus Terry Lyles,
was transporting a prisoner in his police car.' Even though Officer
Lyles had handcuffed the prisoner and searched him for weapons,2
the prisoner managed to get control of a pistol hidden on his person
and shoot Officer Lyles twice in the back.' Officer Lyles was wearing
a bullet-proof vest, so the shots did not enter his back; however, he
did lose control of the car.4 After the car crashed into a parked dump
truck, Officer Lyles left the car to call for assistance on his portable
radio as he had been trained to do.' When the portable radio did not
work, he approached the car to use the radio located inside of it.7
The prisoner, still in possession of the gun, shot Officer Lyles to
death."
In Lyles v. City of Charlotte,9 Officer Lyles's wife brought a
wrongful death action against the City of Charlotte (the "City") for
her husband's death." The City raised governmental immunity as an
affirmative defense.1' However, the City participated in a risk-
1. See Lyles v. City of Charlotte, 344 N.C. 676, 677-78, 477 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1996).
Officer Lyles and his partner had responded to a call involving a domestic dispute and
arrested the prisoner at the scene of the dispute. See Lyles v. City of Charlotte, 120 N.C.
App. 96, 97, 461 S.E.2d 347, 348 (1995), rev'd, 344 N.C. 676, 477 S.E.2d 150 (1996).
Officer Lyles's partner drove away in a separate vehicle. See id.
2. See Lyles, 120 N.C. App. at 97,461 S.E.2d at 348.
3. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 678,477 S.E.2d at 151.
4. See ki at 678,477 S.E.2d at 151-52.
5. See Lyles, 120 N.C. App. at 97,461 S.E.2d at 348.
6. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 678, 477 S.E.2d at 152. Officer Lyles crouched down
behind the vehicle, pressed the emergency button on the radio, and requested assistance.
See Lyles, 120 N.C. App. at 97, 461 S.E.2d at 348. Officer Lyles thought that he would
receive a clear channel of communication with other officers by using the emergency
button. See aL However, Officer Lyles's call for assistance was not sent to other officers
and he did not receive a response. See id
7. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 678, 477 S.E.2d at 152. The attempt by Officer Lyles to
return to the front of his car in order to use his squad car radio was "[iun conformity with
his training." Lyles, 120 N.C. App. at 97,461 S.E.2d at 348.
8. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 678, 477 S.E.2d at 152. The prisoner shot Officer Lyles as
Lyles passed the left rear window of the police car. See Lyles, 120 N.C. App. at 97, 461
S.E.2d at 348-49.
9. 344 N.C. 676,477 S.E.2d 150 (1996).
10. See id. at 677,477 S.E.2d at 151.
11. See Lyles, 120 N.C. App. at 98, 461 S.E.2d at 349. With this defense of
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management program and also had a liability insurance policy,"
which was significant because a North Carolina statute provides that
a city that participates in a local government risk pool or that has
liability insurance to cover an incident has waived its governmental
immunity.' The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the City
had waived its governmental immunity because its risk-management
program fell within the statutory definition of a local government risk
pool. 4 The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and held that the City had not waived its governmental
immunity." According to the supreme court, the City's participation
in the risk-management program did not constitute joining a local
government risk pool and the City's liability insurance did not cover
the allegations by Lyles.'"
While federal and state governments historically have received
absolute immunity from liability, the scope of the doctrine of
municipal immunity gradually has been limited by statute and by
judicial decision." For instance, "virtually every state that has
retained sovereign immunity has limited municipal tort immunity to
the extent that municipal actions can be categorized as proprietary
functions." 8 Several states, including North Carolina, 9 have statutes
governmental, or sovereign, immunity, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings, or,
in the alternative, summary judgment. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 677, 477 S.E.2d at 151.
Sovereign immunity is "[a] judicial doctrine which precludes bringing suit against the
government without its consent." BLACK'S LAw DIcIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
12. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 678,477 S.E.2d at 152.
13. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1994); see also infra note 119 and
accompanying text (quoting this statute). Several states provide for the waiver of
governmental immunity in the presence of liability insurance. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 670.7 (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.06 (West 1994); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 11-46-16 (Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.610 (West Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 21-32A-1 (Michie 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1403 (Supp. 1996).
14. See Lyles, 120 N.C. App. at 99,461 S.E.2d at 349.
15. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 681-82, 477 S.E.2d at 153-54. The supreme court
subsequently denied a petition for rehearing filed by Officer Lyles's widow. See Lyles v.
City of Charlotte, 345 N.C. 355,483 S.E.2d 170 (1997).
16. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 681-82, 477 S.E.2d at 153-54. Throughout this Note,
"Lyles" will refer to Debra Kay Lyles, the wife of Officer Milus Terry Lyles.
17. See Deborah L. Markowitz, Municipal Liability for Negligent Inspection and
Failure to Enforce Safety Codes, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 181, 185 (1994). Only a
minority of states have retained "the traditional doctrine of complete immunity." Id.
1& Id. at 185-86. The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that municipal
corporations act in a proprietary function when they "are acting ... in their ministerial or
corporate character in the management of property for their own benefit, or in the
exercise of powers, assumed voluntarily for their own advantage." Moffitt v. City of
Asheville, 103 N.C. 191, 203, 9 S.E. 695, 697 (1889); see also EUGENE MCQUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.29, at 338 (3d ed. rev. 1993) ("To be proprietary in
nature, an activity must be conducted primarily for the purpose of producing a pecuniary
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providing for the waiver of governmental immunity by local
governments to the extent that the local government has liability
insurance to cover the claim." Additionally, in North Carolina, a
city's participation in a statutory local government risk pool is
deemed the equivalent of purchasing insurance.21 While other states
authorize participation in local government risk pools, such
participation is not always considered a waiver of governmental
immunity.' Thus, one commentator has noted that "[w]ith its explicit
assertion that risk pools are to be treated as insurance, North
Carolina has moved to the forefront in risk-management
interpretation."23 North Carolina's position on the waiver of
governmental immunity was the focus of the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in Lyles.
This Note first discusses the facts of Lyles, the decisions of the
lower courts, and the opinion of the North Carolina Supreme Court.24
Next, the Note examines the history of governmental immunity and
how it may be waived in North Carolina.' The Note then analyzes
the influence of this history on Lyles and how the decision conforms
to and differs from past cases.' Finally, the Note considers reasons a
city might waive governmental immunity as well as arguments
supporting and disfavoring the abolition of the doctrine completely.'
profit and must not normally be supported by taxes or fees."). "Examples of proprietary
functions [according to North Carolina courts] include the operation of a waterworks
system for sale of water for private consumption, the operation of an airport, and the
operation of an arena for the holding of exhibitions and athletic events." Patti Owen
Harper, Statutory Waiver of Municipal Immunity upon Purchase of Liability Insurance in
North Carolina and the Municipal Liability Crisis, 4 CAMPBELL L. REv. 41, 49 (1981)
(footnotes omitted); see also infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text (discussing the
adoption of the governmental/proprietary distinction in North Carolina).
19. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1994); see also infra note 119 (quoting this
statute).
20. See supra note 13 (listing state statutes that provide for the waiver of
governmental immunity in the presence of liability insurance).
21. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485(a).
22. See, e.g., Morgan v. City of Ruleville, 627 So.2d 275, 281 (Miss. 1993) (holding
that a city's participation in the Mississippi Municipal Liability Plan constituted self-
insurance, but did not waive its sovereign immunity); City of Laramie v. Facer, 814 P.2d
268, 271 (Wyo. 1991) (holding that participation in a statewide risk-management program
was not the equivalent of purchasing insurance and was not a waiver of governmental
immunity).
23. Tamura D. Coffey, Comment, Waiving Local Government Immunity in North
Carolina: Risk Management Programs Are Insurance, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 709,731
(1992).
24. See infra notes 28-98 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 99-201 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 202-77 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 278-313 and accompanying text.
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At the time of the incident involving Officer Lyles, the City of
Charlotte had an insurance policy with General Reinsurance
Corporation.2 The policy covered employees' claims arising out of
"'bodily injury by accident or bodily injury by disease,'" but did not
provide coverage for "'bodily injury intentionally caused or
aggravated by or at the direction of the Insured.' ,29 Additionally, the
City of Charlotte participated in a risk-management program with
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education and Mecklenburg
County?0 The three entities entered into an agreement that created a
Division of Insurance and Risk Management ("DIRM") "to handle
liability claims asserted against" them.31 The DIRM maintained a
separate trust account for each entity and each entity was required to
deposit funds into its account to pay claims against it.32 The first
$500,000 of any claim against an entity was to come from the entity's
own account.33 If a judgment was entered for more than $500,000 and
the entity did not have sufficient funds to pay it, then "the entity
[could] use funds that one of the other entities ha[d] in the DIRM in
excess of $500 ,0 00 ,"' but had to repay with interest any funds that it
borrowed from the other entities' accounts. 5
Debra Kay Lyles, the wife of the murdered officer and the
administrator of his estate, brought an action for the wrongful death
of her husband against both the City of Charlotte and the
manufacturer of the portable radio." Lyles alleged that the City and
the manufacturer "intentionally instructed her [husband] to use the
portable radio in a certain way, knowing that if used that way, the
radio would not function and that there was a substantial certainty
that this improper use would result in the death or serious injury of
an officer." 37 The City raised sovereign or governmental immunity as
28. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 678, 477 S.E.2d at 152. The policy covered claims for more
than $250,000, but not exceeding $1,250,000. See id.
29. ld. (quoting the insurance policy).
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See id-
33. See id.
34. Id The DIRM would not pay claims in excess of $1,000,000. See id.
35. See i.
36. See i. at 677-78, 477 S.E.2d at 151. Although the supreme court did not review
the claim against the manufacturer of the radio, the appellate court acknowledged Lyles's
claims against it. See Lyles v. City of Charlotte, 120 N.C. App. 96, 97-98, 461 S.E.2d 347,
359 (1995), rev'd, 344 N.C. 676,477 S.E.2d 150 (1996).
37. Lyles, 344 N.C. at 678,477 S.E.2d at 152.
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an affirmative defense, asserting that it was not subject to suit.'
Based on this defense, the City moved for a judgment on the
pleadings, or alternatively, for summary judgment.39 The superior
court denied both motions.4 On appeal, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the superior court,4' holding that
the City was participating in a local government risk pool and thereby
had waived governmental immunity.42
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in a four-to-three decision,
reversed the court of appeals and granted the City's motion for
summary judgment.43 Justice Webb, writing for the court, began by
noting the two ways in which a city may waive its sovereign immunity
for civil liability in tort.' Under § 160A-485 of the North Carolina
General Statutes,45 a city waives governmental immunity by
participating in a statutory local government risk pool" or by
purchasing liability insurancef Although Lyles asserted that the City
had participated in a local government risk pool under the terms of
the statute," the court disagreed and held that the City's participation
38. Sed Lyles, 120 N.C. App. at 98,461 S.E.2d at 349.
39. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 677,477 S.E.2d at 151.
40. See id. at 678, 477 S.E.2d at 152.
41. See id. For the opinion of the court of appeals, see Lyles v. City of Charlotte, 120
N.C. App. 96,461 S.E.2d 347 (1995), rev'd, 344 N.C. 676,477 S.E.2d 150 (1996).
42. See Lyles, 120 N.C. App. at 106, 461 S.E.2d at 353-54. The court of appeals
reasoned that the ability of an entity to use funds that one of the other entities had in the
DIRM, despite the obligation to repay, provided a "mechanism by which participants
[could] 'pool retention of their risks for property losses and liability claims and ...
provide for the payment of such losses of or claims made against any member of the pool
on a cooperative or contract basis with one another.'" Id at 106, 461 S.E.2d at 353
(quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-23-5 (1994)).
43. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 682,477 S.E.2d at 154.
44. See id. at 679, 477 S.E.2d at 152.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1994).
46. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-23. These pools are established pursuant to Article 23,
Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes. See id. The court quoted §§ 58-23-5
and 58-23-15(3), which govern the establishment of local government risk pools. See
Lyles, 344 N.C. at 679, 477 S.E.2d at 152; see also infra notes 173-74 and accompanying
text (quoting the same statutory sections).
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485; Lyles, 344 N.C. at 679,477 S.E.2d at 152.
48. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 679-80,477 S.E.2d at 152-53. Lyles argued that
because the City has the right, in certain circumstances, to use funds contributed
by the other entities for the payment of claims, the entities had pooled retention
of their risks for liability and provided for the payment of such claims made
against any member of the pool on a cooperative or contract basis.
Id at 679, 477 S.E.2d at 152-53. Even though the City had to repay funds it borrowed
from another entity, Lyles contended that the agreement was in essence a local
government risk pool that met the statutory requirements. See id at 679-80, 477 S.E.2d at
152-53. This argument was the basis of the holding of the court of appeals. See Lyles v.
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in the DIRM did not constitute joining a local government risk pool. 9
To support this holding, the court first noted that the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education did not meet the statutory
definition of "local government" and therefore could not, under the
terms of the statute, join a local government risk pool." The court
did not determine the effect on the agreement of the Board of
Education's inability to join a statutory local government risk pool. 1
Irrespective of whether the Board of Education's participation had
any effect, the court still concluded that the agreement did not
constitute a risk pool." The court had little precedent to guide it, as
only one case, Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem, 3 had
"interpret[ed] the statute as to what constitutes a local government
risk pool."
Regardless of the Board of Education issue, the court
determined that the City's agreement did not entail sufficient risk-
sharing to create a local government risk pool.5 Noting that
§ 58-23-15 of the North Carolina General Statutes requires that the
risk pool pay all claims for which an entity is liable,56 the court stated
that "the pool has [not] paid a claim if it is reimbursed for it."'
Additionally, § 58-23-5 of the North Carolina General Statutes states
that risk pools may be formed by local governments "to pool
retention of their risks for ... liability claims.""8  The court
interpreted this language to require the local governments to
consolidate their funds into one pool for the payment of claims,
City of Charlotte, 120 N.C. App. 96,105-06,461 S.E.2d 347,353-54 (1995), rev'd, 344 N.C.
676, 477 S.E.2d 150 (1996). Lyles also argued that the City waived its immunity by
purchasing liability insurance. See infra notes 64-73 (discussing the issue of liability
insurance).
49. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 681,477 S.E.2d at 153.
50. See id at 680, 477 S.E.2d at 153. Under Article 23 of Chapter 58 of the North
Carolina General Statutes, "'local government' means any county, city, or housing
authority located in [North Carolina]." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-23-1.
51. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 680, 477 S.E.2d at 153. The court expressly declined to
determine the effect that a non-eligible entity, specifically the Board, would have on the
otherwise eligible local government risk pool. See id. Instead, the court determined that
the agreement did not constitute a statutory local government risk pool. See id.
52. See iL
53. 332 N.C. 319,420 S.E.2d 432 (1992).
54. Lyles, 344 N.C. at 680, 477 S.E.2d at 153. Blackwelder held that a local
government risk pool requires at least two local governments. See Blackwelder, 332 N.C.
at 322, 420 S.E.2d at 434. For a discussion of Blackwelder, see infra notes 177-88 and
accompanying text.
55. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 680,477 S.E.2d at 153.
56. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-23-15 (1994).
57. Lyles, 344 N.C. at 680,477 S.E.2d at 153.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-23-5.
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which was not done in the City's agreement.59 Finally, the court
found no evidence that the entities involved in the present agreement
had met the statutory requirements 6' for organizing a local
government risk pool.1 The court noted that this failure to comply
with statutory requirements, although not determinative, "should be
given some weight."6' 2 Based on this statutory interpretation, the
court held that the City did not join a local government risk pool and
thus had not waived its governmental immunity in that regard.'
Lyles also argued that her husband's death was accidental and
that the City had waived its immunity to the extent that it had
liability insurance to cover the claim.' The court noted that the
policy covered "claims for bodily injury of City employees by
accident and exclude[d] coverage for 'bodily injury intentionally
caused or aggravated by or at the direction of the Insured.' 1365
However, Lyles brought the action pursuant to the exception to the
exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act created in
Woodson v. Rowland,' "alleging that the [City] knew or should have
59. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 680,477 S.E.2d at 153.
60. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-23; see also infra notes 173-74 (quoting certain
provisions of Article 23 of Chapter 58 that mention some of these statutory
requirements). For example, parties seeking to join a local government risk pool must
give the Commissioner of Insurance of North Carolina 30 days written notice of their
intent to organize and operate a local government risk pool. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-
23-5. The parties also must meet requirements regarding the creation of a board of
trustees and for the operation of the pools. See id. § 58-23-10. In addition, there are
requirements pertaining to provisions that must be included in the risk pool agreement,
see id. § 58-23-15, and to the financial monitoring and evaluation of the risk pools, see id.
§ 58-23-26.
61. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 680,477 S.E.2d at 153.
62. Id. at 680-81, 477 S.E.2d at 153. If the City did not meet the statutory
requirements for joining a local government risk pool, "its payment of government funds
to settle tort claims to which governmental immunity applies would appear to be ultra
vires." Id. at 686, 477 S.E.2d at 156 (Frye, J., dissenting). Ultra vires describes "[a]n act
performed without any authority to act on [the] subject." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1522 (6th ed. 1990). The majority declined to address the issue of whether it was ultra
vires for the City to create the DIRM, because that issue was not raised by the parties.
See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 681, 477 S.E.2d at 153. The court then refuted the dissent's
argument that the DIRM was a local government risk pool because it would be ultra vires
otherwise. See id at 681, 477 S.E.2d at 153; see also infra notes 79-85 and accompanying
text (discussing the dissent's presumption that the City complied with the statutory
requirements so the that risk pool would not be ultra vires).
63. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 681,477 S.E.2d at 153.
64. See id. The City's policy covered claims in excess of $250,000, but not more than
$1,250,000. See id.
65. Id. (quoting the insurance policy).
66. 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991). In Woodson, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that an employee may pursue a civil action against an employer "when [the]
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known that its action in instructing its officers how to use the radios
was substantially certain to cause the death or serious injury of an
officer."67 In response to this allegation, the City argued that Lyles
had asserted a claim that was not covered by the insurance policy
because the policy covered only accidental injuries and expressly
excluded intentional injuries of the type alleged by Lyles."
The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the City,
holding that "when [Lyles] alleged the City's action was substantially
certain to cause an injury, she alleged the occurrence was not
accidental"69 and therefore removed the claim from insurance
coverage.70 The court distinguished its previous decision in Woodson,
in which it held that facts asserted in a civil action that demonstrate
substantial certainty of injury may nevertheless also allow a workers'
compensation claim on an accident theory.7' The court explained that
because Lyles did not bring a workers' compensation claim, she could
not rely on the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act to
determine whether her claim was based on an accident.' Because the
court determined that the City was not participating in a local
governmental risk pool and did not have liability insurance to cover
Lyles's claim, it held that the City had not waived its governmental
immunity and therefore that summary judgment for the City was
appropriate.73
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Frye disagreed with the majority
on both the local government risk pool and the liability insurance
issues.74  Although Justice Frye acknowledged that the City's
agreement with Mecklenburg County and the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education may not have met the statutory
requirements for a local government risk pool, he argued that the
employer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is substantially certain to cause
serious injury or death to employees and [the] employee is injured or killed by that
misconduct." Id at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228; see infra notes 149-61 and accompanying
text (analyzing Woodson). If Lyles had a Woodson claim, then worker's compensation
would not be her exclusive remedy. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 681,477 S.E.2d at 154.
67. Lyles, 344 N.C. at 681, 477 S.E.2d at 154. The court did not decide whether Lyles
had a Woodson claim because the issue was not raised on appeal. See Id. However, for
the purpose of analysis, the court assumed that Lyles had a valid Woodson claim. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 682, 477 S.E.2d at 154 (citing North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Stox, 330 N.C. 697,709,412 S.E.2d 318,325 (1992)).
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. (Frye, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Mitchell and Justice Lake joined
Justice Frye's dissenting opinion. See id at 689,477 S.E.2d at 158 (Frye, J., dissenting).
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agreement in this case was essentially a risk pool and that the City
had consequently waived its governmental immunity.75 The dissent
supported its position with policy considerations:
Under such a scheme, the decision of the local government
officials is not reviewable, and the awards to injured parties
may be distributed on an arbitrary basis without any
opportunity for the injured party to have the decision of the
local government reviewed by the courts. Even the State of
North Carolina does not have such unbridled discretion.76
After reviewing the relevant statutes and the court's prior decision in
Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem.7 the dissent then criticized the
Lyles majority and the Blackwelder court for implicitly assuming that
a city could enter a government risk-management program not
authorized by statute.78
The dissent suggested that risk-management programs other
than those allowed by statute may be ultra vires'79 "[A] municipality
must have a legal obligation to make a payment in order to distribute
governmental funds." "[T]o the extent a municipality retains its
sovereign immunity, it has no authority to pay [a] claim against it."8
The dissent noted that municipalities can exercise only the power
given to them by the legislature,2 and questioned the City's authority
to "negotiate, settle, and pay tort claims against it under the risk-
management program.""n According to the dissent, the City had
either waived its governmental immunity by participating in the risk-
management program, "or its payment of governmental funds to
settle tort claims ... would appear to be ultra vires."' " The dissent
presumed that the City, to avoid actions that might be ultra vires, had
complied with the statutes in establishing the risk-management
program and concluded that the City's participation in the program
75. See id- at 684,477 S.E.2d at 155 (Frye, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Frye, J., dissenting).
77. 332 N.C. 319, 420 S.E.2d 432 (1992); see supra note 54 (discussing Blackwelder's
holding); infra notes 177-88 and accompanying text (analyzing Blackwelder in more
detail).
78. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 685,477 S.E.2d at 156 (Frye, J., dissenting).
79. See id. (Frye, J., dissenting); supra note 62 (defining ultra vires).
80. Lyles, 344 N.C. at 685, 477 S.E.2d at 156 (Frye, J., dissenting) (citing Leete v.
County of Warren, 341 N.C. 116,120-21,462 S.E.2d 476,479 (1995)).
81. Id. at 686,477 S.E.2d at 156 (Frye, J., dissenting).
82. See id. (Frye, J., dissenting) (citing Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C. 413,
417,451 S.E.2d 284,287 (1994)).
83. Id. (Frye, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Frye, J., dissenting).
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waived its governmental immunity.Y
Justice Frye next addressed the issue of whether the City's
liability insurance covered Lyles's claim, such that governmental
immunity had been waived. 6 The dissent disagreed with the
majority, which had relied on North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Stoic' to hold that Lyles's claim was excluded from
insurance coverage because she alleged that "the City's action was
substantially certain to cause injury."' First, the dissent distinguished
Stox because that case did not involve a Woodson claim. 9 Also,
contrary to the majority's opinion, the dissent stated that Stox
suggested that the City's liability insurance would cover the claim in
Lyles because the insurance policy in Stox contained an exclusion
similar to the one at issue in Lyles and the Stox court found the
exclusion to be inapplicable when the injury was an unexpected result
of an intentional act." Quoting Stox, the dissent pointed out that" 'it
is the resulting injury, not merely the volitional act, which must be
intended for [the] exclusion to apply.' .... Thus, the exclusion
provision in the City's insurance policy should not have applied to
Lyles's claim.9
Second, the dissent noted that Woodson does not require actual
intent to harm "'for an employer's conduct to be actionable in tort
and not protected by the exclusivity provisions of worker's
compensation.' " In order to be liable, an employer in a Woodson
action only has to engage intentionally in conduct that is substantially
85. See id (Frye, J., dissenting).
86. See id. (Frye, J., dissenting).
87. 330 N.C. 697, 412 S.E.2d 318 (1992); see also infra notes 135-48 and
accompanying text (discussing Stox).
8& Lyles, 344 N.C. at 686,477 S.E.2d at 157 (Frye, J., dissenting).
89. See id. (Frye, J., dissenting). Stox involved a claim under a homeowner's
insurance policy by a co-employee of the insured for injuries caused by the insured at
their place of employment. See Stox, 330 N.C. at 699, 412 S.E.2d at 320. The Lyles
dissent also noted that the court has never addressed whether a Woodson claim is covered
by liability insurance. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 686-87, 477 S.E.2d at 157 (Frye, J.,
dissenting).
90. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 687,477 S.E.2d at 157 (Frye, J., dissenting). The insurance
policy in Stox excluded claims for " '" bodily injury.., which is expected or intended by
the insured .... Id. (Frye, J., dissenting) (omission in original) (quoting Stox, 330 N.C. at
703, 412 S.E.2d at 322 (quoting the insurance policy)).
91. Id. (Frye, 3., dissenting) (quoting Stox, 330 N.C. at 703-04,412 S.E.2d at 322).
92. See id. at 688,477 S.E.2d at 157 (Frye, J., dissenting). The court noted there were
no allegations that Lyles "believes or contends that the police department did anything
with the intent to injure or to kill Mr. Lyles or anyone else." Id. (Frye, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Frye, J., dissenting) (quoting Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 344, 407
S.E.2d 222,230 (1991)).
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certain to result in serious injury or death.' This level of conduct is
"' "so egregious as to be tantamount to an intentional tort."' ,,.8 The
dissent criticized the court for drawing an untenable line between
intentional torts and egregious conduct that is tantamount to an
intentional tort" and determined that conduct on the substantial-
certainty side of this line should not be excluded under the City's
insurance policy.' The dissent asserted that the City had waived its
governmental immunity by participating in a local government risk
pool and by purchasing insurance that covered Lyles's claim, and
therefore the City's motion for summary judgment should have been
denied.98
Sovereign (or governmental) immunity is "[a] judicial doctrine
which precludes bringing suit against the government without its
consent."" The doctrine possibly originated in Roman law and has
significant roots in England."" Although the United States Supreme
Court adopted the doctrine of sovereign immunity for the federal
government in the early nineteenth century,'' subsequent North
Carolina Supreme Court decisions refused to adopt the doctrine for
municipalities.'0
In 1889, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court applied
the doctrine to claims against municipalities, at least in part, in
Moffitt v. City of Asheville."3 In Moffitt, a prisoner brought an action
against the City bf Asheville seeking damages for physical illness
94. See id. at 688,477 S.E.2d at 158 (Frye, J., dissenting) (citing Owens v. W.K. Deal
Printing, Inc., 339 N.C. 603, 604,453 S.E.2d 160,161 (1995)).
95. Id (Frye, J., dissenting) (quoting Owens, 339 N.C. at 604, 453 S.E.2d at 161
(quoting Pendergrass v. Card Care, Inc., 333 N.C. 233,239,424 S.E.2d 391,395 (1993))).
96. See id (Frye, J., dissenting).
97. See id. at 689,477 S.E.2d at 158 (Frye, J., dissenting).
98. See id. at 686,477 S.E.2d at 156 (Frye, J., dissenting).
99. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
100. See Harper, supra note 18, at 44-45. For a detailed discussion of the doctrine's
historical development, see id passim, and Beecher Reynolds Gray, Comment, Local
Government Sovereign Immunity: The Need for Reform, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 43,44
(1982).
101. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 264,303 (1821).
102 See Wright v. City of Wilmington, 92 N.C. 156 (1885); Meares v. Commissioners
of Wilmington, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 61, 73 (1848) (per curiam). An English court first
applied the doctrine to claims against a municipality in 1788. See Gray, supra note 100, at
44 (citing Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788)). However, this
decision occurred after North Carolina already had adopted English common law as it
existed prior to the Declaration of Independence in 1776. See Harper, supra note 18, at
46. Section 4-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes authorized adoption of English
common law. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1986).
103. 103 N.C. 191,9 S.E. 695 (1889).
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caused by his confinement in the city's prison without adequate heat
and blankets on a cold night.'" The court had to decide whether the
City of Asheville could be found liable for the prisoner's injuries, or
whether governmental immunity for municipalities should be
adopted.'O' The court began its analysis by noting the two capacities
in which a city may act-it may act for its own benefit as a private
corporation or it may exercise governmental duties as conferred by
its charter. ' The court used this distinction to expound two rules
governing the application of governmental immunity to a given
situation. The first rule stated that when a municipal corporation acts
in a "ministerial or corporate character in the management of
property for [its] own benefit, or in the exercise of powers, assumed
voluntarily for [its] own advantage," the municipal corporation is
"impliedly liable for damage caused by the negligence of officers or
agents, subject to their control" even if the municipality receives a
general benefit from the activity.' The second rule adopted by the
court stated that if a city or town is "exercising the judicial,
discretionary or legislative authority, conferred by its charter, or is
discharging a duty, imposed solely for the benefit of the public," then
the city or town will not be found liable "for the negligence of its
officers, though acting under color of office" unless a statute
explicitly, or by necessary implication, provides that the city or town
may be held liable for damages resulting from shch negligence. "'
Thus, in Moffitt, the state supreme court extended sovereign
immunity to municipalities acting in a governmental capacity and
denied it to municipalities acting for proprietary purposes
The municipal immunity rules from Moffitt remained
unchallenged until 1950,"10 when the doctrine withstood a significant
attack in Stephenson v. City of Raleigh."' Stephenson sued the City
104. See id. at 192, 9 S.E. at 696.
105. See id at 203, 9 S.E. at 697.
106. See a
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 203-04, 9 S.E. at 697. The court found that a city's construction and
supervision of prisons is a governmental function and that, as a general rule, counties and
towns cannot be found liable for injuries to prisoners "caused by the neglect of their
respective jailers, policemen or guards who may have immediate charge and custody of
them, and of which the governing officials of the corporation had no notice." Id. at 206, 9
S.E. at 699. For examples of proprietary functions, see infra note 279.
110. See Harper, supra note 18, at 48-49 ("From Moffitt to the present time, North
Carolina courts have continued to extend sovereign immunity to governmental functions
and to deny it to proprietary functions.").
111. 232 N.C. 42,59 S.E.2d 195 (1950).
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of Raleigh for the death of her husband as a result of injuries he
sustained in a collision with a city truck that was collecting trimmings
from trees and bushes along city streets.1 2 The Stephenson court
concluded that this service was a governmental function and
therefore governmental immunity applied."' Because the City of
Raleigh had liability insurance that indemnified it for liability due to
accidents involving its vehicles,"4 Stephenson argued that immunity
had been waived." The court rejected this argument and held that,
absent express statutory authority, a municipality's purchase of
liability insurance does not constitute a waiver of its governmental
immunity.1
6
In 1951, one year after the decision in Stephenson, the North
Carolina General Assembly enacted a statute which provided that a
city waives its sovereign immunity for liability resulting from the
negligent operation of motor vehicles when it obtains liability
insurance."7 This statute has evolved over the years" s and currently is
embodied in § 160A-485 of the North Carolina General Statutes."'
112. See id. at 43, 59 S.E.2d at 196.
113. See id. at 46,59 S.E.2d at 198-99.
114. See id. at 44-45, 59 S.E.2d at 197.
115. See id. at 45,59 S.E.2d at 198.
116. See id. at 47, 59 S.E.2d at 199.
117. See Act of Apr. 14, 1951, ch. 1015, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws 1007 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1994)); see also Harper, supra note 18, at 54-55
(discussing important features of the statute).
118. See Harper, supra note 18, at 54-56 (discussing the evolution of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160A-485 through 1981).
119. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485. The relevant portions state:
(a) Any city is authorized to waive its immunity from civil liability in tort by the
act of purchasing liability insurance. Participation in a local government risk
pool pursuant to Article 23 of General Statutes Chapter 58 shall be deemed to
be the purchase of insurance for the purposes of this section. Immunity shall be
waived only to the extent that the city is indemnified by the insurance contract
from tort liability. No formal action other than the purchase of liability
insurance shall be required to waive tort immunity, and no city shall be deemed
to have waived its tort immunity by any action other than the purchase of
liability insurance.
ic) Any plaintiff may maintain a tort claim against a city insured under this
section in any court of competent jurisdiction. As to any such claim, to the
extent that the city is insured against such claim pursuant to this section,
governmental immunity shall be no defense.... No judgment may be entered
against a city in excess of its insurance policy limits on any tort claim for which it
would have been immune but for the purchase of liability insurance pursuant to
this section.
Id. In addition to providing for the waiver of immunities by cities, North Carolina has a
similar statute providing for the waiver of immunity by counties. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
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This section authorizes a city to waive its immunity from civil liability
by purchasing insurance. '2' Under the statute, a city's participation in
a local government risk pool pursuant to Article 23 of Chapter 58 of
the North Carolina General Statutes is equivalent to the purchase of
insurance under § 160A-485." ' However, a city's immunity is waived
only to the extent that the city "is indemnified by the insurance
contract from tort liability."" In addition, the purchase of liability
insurance alone is sufficient to waive immunity, but a city may not
waive its immunity by any action other than purchasing insurance."
The statute also states explicitly that governmental immunity is not a
defense "to the extent that the city is insured against [tort] claims."'2'4
However, "[n]o judgment may be entered against a city in excess of
its insurance policy limits on any tort claim for which it would have
been immune but for the purchase of liability insurance pursuant to
this section." '
Because the statute clearly indicates that a city's immunity is
waived to the extent that the city is indemnified by its insurance
contract,1" the key issue is whether the insurance contract covers the
alleged incident, which sometimes requires the court to interpret
provisions in the contract. The following cases illustrate
interpretations of insurance policies by the North Carolina courts and
how these interpretations are relevant to a court's determination in
municipal immunity cases of whether a city's policy provides
coverage for an injury.
In Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Mauldin, V an insurance
company sought a declaration against the estate of a murder victim
that the homeowner's insurance policy did not cover liability arising
§ 153A-435 (1991).
120. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485(a).
121. See &L
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. Id. § 160A-485(c).
125. 1&
126. See id. § 160A-485; see also Jones v. Kearns, 120 N.C. App. 301, 303, 462 S.E.2d
245, 246 (1995) (holding the City of Winston-Salem not liable for damages less than
$250,000 when the City's insurance policy covered only damages exceeding $250,000);
Combs v. Town of Belhaven, 106 N.C. App. 71, 73-74, 415 S.E.2d 91, 92-93 (1992)
(holding a town not liable because it had no insurance coverage for the acts of employees
damaging plaintiff's real and personal property while removing allegedly "junked"
vehicles from plaintiff's premises); Wiggins v. City of Monroe, 73 N.C. App. 44,49-52,326
S.E.2d 39, 43-44 (1985) (holding a city liable because it was indemnified by its insurance
policy for damages to plaintiffs house as occasioned by an order by the city's chief
building inspector to demolish it).
127. 62 N.C. App. 461,303 S.E.2d 214 (1983).
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out of the shooting of the decedent by the insured.1 2 The insured's
wife and the decedent were in a vehicle, and the insured shot a pistol
into the car with the intent to kill his wife but without a specific intent
to kill the decedent.129 The homeowner's policy did not apply "'to
bodily injury or property damage which is either expected or
intended from the standpoint of the insured.' ,1
In determining whether the insured's act fell within the
exclusion, the North Carolina Court of Appeals asserted that there
was little ambiguity in the contractual language: "The sentence
obviously means that the policy is excluding from coverage bodily
injury caused by the insured's intentional acts, determining whether
the act is intentional from the insured's point of view.... Despite the
insured's stipulation that he intended to kill his wife and not the
decedent, the court held that the insured was not covered by the
policy because he pled guilty to second degree murder 2 Noting that
second degree murder will always consist of a general intent to
commit the act, but not necessarily the specific intent to achieve a
purpose or desired result,13 the court held that the insured's
admission of general intent, by pleading guilty to second degree
murder, excluded him from coverage under the insurance policy."M
The North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted a similar
provision in North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Stox. 35  In Stox, the insurance company sought a declaratory
judgment regarding whether an incident involving one of its
policyholders was covered by the policyholder's homeowner's
insurance policy. 3' The policy excluded medical payments to others
as a result of "'bodily injury or property damage'" that "'is
expected or intended by the insured.' ,,137 The insured, an employee
of a shoe store, pushed Stox, one of his co-employees at work, and
128. See id. at 461,303 S.E.2d at 215.
129. See idL The insured later pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to kill his wife and to second degree murder. See id. at 462, 303 S.E.2d at 216.
130. Id. at 462,303 S.E.2d at 215 (quoting the insurance policy).
131. Id. at 463,303 S.E.2d at 216.
132. See id. at 464,303 S.E.2d at 216.
133. See id. at 464, 303 S.E.2d at 217 (citing State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 580-81,
247 S.E.2d 905, 917 (1978)).
134. See id. The court briefly noted that the insured should have expected the
likelihood of one of the bullets hitting the victim. See id.
135. 330 N.C. 697,412 S.E.2d 318 (1992).
136. See id. at 699,412 S.E.2d at 320.
137. Itt at 700,412 S.E.2d at 321 (quoting the insurance policy).
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told her to "'get away from here.' "" Stox fell to the floor and
severely fractured her right arm.139 At trial, Stox testified that she
could have prevented the fall if she had expected the push,'" and the
insured testified that "he did not intend to knock Stox to the floor or
cause her any injury. 14' Based on the trial court's findings of fact, the
supreme court classified the injury as "'the unintended result of an
intentional act.' ,,42 Although the North Carolina Court of Appeals
had relied on Mauldin14 in holding that the policy excluded Stox's
injury,'44 the supreme court held that the resulting injury, in addition
to a volitional act, must be intended in order for the exclusion to
apply.'45 The supreme court explained that the insured's push of Stox
was not at a level that required an inference of an intent to inflict an
injury." The court also stated that the insurer "must prove that the
injury itself was expected or intended" and that "[m]erely showing
the act was intentional will not suffice" to avoid coverage based on an
exclusion in an insurance policy pertaining to expected or intended
injuries."4 Thus, the court held that the injury to Stox was covered by
the homeowner's insurance policy.'"
Although the 1991 case of Woodson v. Rowland'.. involved
workers' compensation rather than liability insurance, its holding as
to when an injury is "intentional"'" had tremendous impact on future
13& Id. at 699-700, 412 S.E.2d at 320. Stox was apparently talking to a customer's
mother while the insured was assisting the customer. See id. at 699,412 S.E.2d at 320.
139. See id. at 700, 412 S.E.2d at 320.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 703, 412 S.E.2d at 322 (quoting the trial court's findings of fact).
143. See supra notes 127-34 and accompanying text (discussing Mauldin).
144. See Stox, 330 N.C. at 703, 412 S.E.2d at 322.
145. See U. at 703-04,412 S.E.2d at 322. The supreme court distinguished Mauldin on
the basis that the insured in that case "obviously knew it was probable that he would
injure [the decedent] when he fired four or five shots into her moving car." Id. at 704,412
S.E.2d at 322. This knowledge of probability effectively rendered the injury intentional.
See 1.
146. See id& at 706, 412 S.E.2d at 324.
147. Id.
148. See i. at 711,412 S.E.2d at 327.
149. 329 N.C. 330,407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).
150. See id. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228. Workers' compensation is a statutory strict
liability scheme that provides compensation to employees for "injur[ies] by accident
arising out of and in the course of the employment." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (Supp.
1996). For a discussion of the intentional injury exception to the Workers' Compensation
Act in North Carolina, see generally Melissa F. Ross, Comment, Ripples in Treacherous
Waters: A Consideration of the Effects of North Carolina's Intentional Tort Exception to
Workers' Compensation, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 513 (1996).
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cases. In Woodson, an employee of a subcontractor hired to dig a
trench for a sewer line was killed when the walls of the trench
collapsed." Woodson, the administrator of the decedent's estate,
brought a wrongful death action arising from the decedent's work-
related death." Because the death was work-related, Woodson also
had a workers' compensation claim."3 In most cases, workers'
compensation is the exclusive remedy available to injured employees,
so the defendant-employer moved for summary judgment." In
determining whether the motion should be granted, the North
Carolina Supreme Court stated that if the employer could show that
death was accidental, the defendants' motions for summary judgment
should be allowed because the death would fall within the exclusive
coverage of the Workers' Compensation Act, and Woodson would
have no other remedies against the decedent's employer or co-
worker.' 5 However, if the death was proven to be "the result of an
intentional tort committed by his employer,1 56 then the motion for
summary judgment should be denied." Though Woodson could not
prove that the employer intended to injure or kill the decedent, the
court, adopting a new standard for the exclusivity provision, stated
that Woodson needed to show only that the employer engaged in
conduct knowing that it was "substantially certain" to cause death or
serious injury.'8 The court held:
[W]hen an employer intentionally engages in misconduct
knowing it is substantially certain to cause serious injury or
death to employees and an employee is injured or killed by
that misconduct, that employee, or the personal
representative of the estate in case of death, may pursue a
151. See Woodson, 329 N.C. at 334-36, 407 S.E.2d at 224-26. The court stated that the
evidence was such that "a reasonable juror could determine that upon placing a man in
this trench serious injury or death as a result of a cave-in was a substantial certainty
rather than an unforeseeable event, mere possibility, or even substantial probability." Id.
at 345, 407 S.E.2d at 231.
152. See iL at 334,407 S.E.2d at 224.
153. See id. at 336, 407 S.E.2d at 226; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2 (relating to the
basis of recovery under the Workers' Compensation Act).
154. See Woodson, 329 N.C. at 337,407 S.E.2d at 226.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228. Only a few states have a rule similar to the
"substantial certainty" standard adopted by North Carolina in Woodson. See Darin
Calbreath Davidson, Comment, Expansion of the "Deliberate Intention" Exception to
Washington's Workers' Compensation Exclusivity: Following Birklid v. Boeing Co., When
Does an Employer Intend Employee Injury?, 32 GONZ. L. REv. 225, 233 (1996); Ross,
supra note 150, at 521.
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civil action against the employer. Such misconduct is
tantamount to an intentional tort, and civil actions based
thereon are not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the
Act. Because ... the injury or death caused by such
misconduct is nonetheless the result of an accident under
the Act, workers' compensation claims may also be pursued.
There may, however, only be one recovery.159
Thus, for a plaintiff to circumvent the exclusivity provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act, she needs to show that the employer
engaged in conduct knowing that it was substantially certain to cause
serious injury or death."64 In addition, such conduct can still be
classified as an accident for purposes of the Workers' Compensation
Act, leaving the choice of remedy to the plaintiff.1'
The North Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed and clarified its
Woodson position on intentional acts in Pendergrass v. Card Care,
Inc.12 In Pendergrass, an employee was injured when his arm was
caught in a machine he was operating." Among other things, the
employee attempted to assert a claim under Woodson, so he would
not be limited by the exclusive remedy provided in the Workers'
Compensation Act.1" In rejecting the employee's claim against his
employer, the court stated the general rule from Woodson that allows
an injured employee to bring a tort claim against his employer if the
employee's injury was the result of intentional conduct by the
employer "which the employer knew was substantially certain to
cause an injury ... [and was] so egregious as to be tantamount to an
intentional tort."'' The court also stated that the level of conduct
required for a Woodson claim involves "a higher degree of
negligence than willful, wanton and reckless negligence."'" Because
159. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340-41,407 S.E.2d at 228.
160. See id.
161. See A
162. 333 N.C. 233, 424 S.E.2d 391 (1993).
163. See id. at 236, 424 S.E.2d at 393.
164. See id, at 239, 424 S.E.2d at 395. The court had previously ruled, on a separate
claim in the same action, that the "negligence alleged did not rise to the level of willful,
wanton, and reckless." Id at 240,424 S.E.2d at 395. The "willful, wanton, and reckless"
standard is used when determining if the exclusivity provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act applies to claims against co-employees. See Pleasant v. Johnson, 312
N.C. 710,717-18,325 S.E.2d 244,249-50 (1985).
165. Pendergrass, 333 N.C. at 239, 424 S.E.2d at 395 (emphasis added) (discussing
Woodson); see also Owens v. W.K. Deal Printing, Inc., 339 N.C. 603, 604, 453 S.E.2d 160,
161 (1995) (quoting Pendergrass and stating that an action under Woodson does not
require an intentional tort "in the true sense of that term"), rev'g per curiam 113 N.C.
App. 324,438 S.E.2d 440 (1994).
166. Pendergrass, 333 N.C. at 239,424 S.E.2d at 395.
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the employee did not produce evidence to meet this standard, the
court held that the employee could not sustain an action in tort
against his employer.67
Woodson and Pendergrass provide that an injured employee may
avoid the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act
and may bring an action in tort against an employer if he can prove
that the injury was caused by the employer's intentional conduct,
which the employer knew was substantially certain to cause death or
serious injury to the employee.6 In the context of insurance policies
that exclude coverage for "bodily injury or property damage which is
expected or intended by the insured," the North Carolina courts have
required the insurer to prove that the injury itself was expected or
intended.'69 If a city has purchased liability insurance, the policy may
contain a similar exclusion for injuries or damages that are expected
or intended by the city. Thus, in deciding whether a city with liability
insurance may raise governmental immunity as a defense, a court will
have to interpret the policy to determine if it covers the claimed
injury.170
A city may waive its governmental immunity not only by
purchasing liability insurance, but also by participating in a local
government risk pool.' Under § 160A-485 of the North Carolina
General Statutes, "participation in a [statutory] local government risk
pool" is deemed the equivalent of a purchase of insurance, such that
the city's immunity is waived.' Section 58-23-5 of the North
Carolina General Statutes states that two or more local governments
may enter into risk pool agreements to protect against property
losses and liability claims." In addition, § 58-23-15(3) requires these
167. See U at 240,424 S.E.2d at 395.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 159, 165 (stating respectively the holdings of
Woodson and Pendergrass).
169. See supra notes 127-48 (discussing Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Mauldin,
62 N.C. App. 461, 303 S.E.2d 214 (1983), and North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Stox, 330 N.C. 697,412 S.E.2d 318 (1992)).
170. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1994); supra note 119 (quoting § 160A-485).
171. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485. See generally Coffey, supra note 23 (discussing
risk pools under § 160A-485 and discussing other, non-statutory risk-management
programs).
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485.
173. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-23-5 (1994). Section 58-23-5 states:
In addition to other authority granted pursuant to Chapters 153A and 160A of
the General Statutes, two or more local governments may enter into contracts or
agreements pursuant to this Article for the joint purchasing of insurance or to
pool retention of their risks for property losses and liability claims and to
provide for the payment of such losses of or claims made against any member of
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agreements to provide that the pool will pay all claims for which each
member incurs liability, subject to certain limited exceptions." The
inclusion of local government risk pools as a means of waiving
governmental immunity occurred when the General Assembly
amended § 160A-485 in 1986."75 Although the amendment has been
in force for over a decade, few cases have involved the risk pool
prong of the governmental immunity statute. 76
The North Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted this statute
only once, in Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem." Blackwelder
filed a personal injury action against Winston-Salem, alleging that
one of its employees was negligent in operating a leaf collection truck
and that his negligence proximately caused Blackwelder's injuries. 78
Winston-Salem raised governmental immunity as an affirmative
defense and moved for partial summary judgment.19  Blackwelder
also moved for partial summary judgment, asking the court to bar
Winston-Salem's governmental immunity defense.' Winston-Salem
had liability insurance to cover claims in excess of $1,000,000 and had
organized a corporation, Risk Acceptance Management Corporation
the pool on a cooperative or contract basis with one another, or may enter into a
trust agreement to carry out the provisions of this Article.... Such local
governments shall give the Commissioner [of Insurance of North Carolina] 30
days' advance written notification, in a form prescribed by the Commissioner,
that they intend to organize and operate risk pools pursuant to this article.
ld.
174. See ad § 58-23-15. Section 58-23-15 states:
A contract or agreement made pursuant to this Article must contain provisions:
(3) Requiring the pool to pay all claims for which each member incurs
liability during each member's period of membership, except where a
member has individually retained the risk, where the risk is not covered,
and except for amount of claims above the coverage provided by the pool.
Id.
175. See Act of July 16, 1986, ch. 1027, 1986 N.C. Sess. Laws 635 (codified as amended
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485). One commentator has noted that "[t]he rationale
underlying this amendment is sound: once local government funds are pooled, the third
party administrator of the pool acts as the insurer, paying the claims from a centralized
fund." Coffey, supra note 23, at 731.
176. See Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem, 332 N.C. 319, 420 S.E.2d 432 (1992)
(discussing local government risk pools under the North Carolina General Statutes);
Pharr v. Worley, 125 N.C. App. 136, 479 S.E.2d 32 (1997) (same); Hallman v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 124 N.C. App. 435, 477 S.E.2d 179 (1996) (same); Cross v.
Residential Support Servs., Inc., 123 N.C. App. 616,473 S.E.2d 676 (1996) (same).
177. 332 N.C. 319,420 S.E.2d 432 (1992).
178. See id. at 320,420 S.E.2d at 433.
179. See id.
180. See id.
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("RAMCO"), to handle claims of $1,000,000 or less.' One issue
before the court was whether Winston-Salem's organization of
RAMCO constituted a statutory local government risk pool, thereby
waiving its governmental immunity." The court held that Winston-
Salem had not formed a local- government risk pool because, under
the statute, two or more governments are needed to form a risk
pool."
A second issue before the Blackwelder court was whether
Winston-Salem effectively had purchased liability insurance by
forming and operating RAMCO.'" The court first examined the
statutory definition of insurance contract as an agreement by which
the insurer pays money to the insured when something in which the
insurer has an interest is destroyed, lost, or injured." The court
stated that Winston-Salem had not entered into an insurance contract
with RAMCO because "RAMCO has not agreed to pay any money
or do any act as an indemnity to the City for loss or injury to the
City.""' Additionally, there was no apparent shifting of risk between
the insured and the insurer.m  Therefore, the court held that
Winston-Salem had not waived its governmental immunity by the
purchase of liability insurance.'
Four years later, in Wall v. City of Raleigh,"9 the North Carolina
181. See id. at 320, 420 S.E.2d at 434. In addition to the $1,000,000 limit under
RAMCO, the City also "agreed to pay to RAMCO $600,000 annually and to reimburse
RAMCO for operating expenses, borrowed funds, and all other costs." Id. at 321, 420
S.E.2d at 434.
182. See i at 321-22,420 S.E.2d at 434.
183. See id. at 322, 420 S.E.2d at 434; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-23-5 (1994); supra note
173 (quoting § 58-23-5). No other local government was sharing the risk with Winston-
Salem. See Blackwelder, 332 N.C. at 322, 420 S.E.2d at 434.
184. See Blackwelder, 332 N.C. at 322, 420 S.E.2d at 434-35. If the court had
determined that the formation of RAMCO constituted a purchase of liability insurance,
Winston-Salem would be deemed to have waived its governmental immunity. See supra
notes 119-25 and accompanying text (explaining that a government waives its immunity to
the extent that it purchased liability insurance that covers a claim).
185. See Blackwelder, 332 N.C. at 322, 420 S.E.2d at 435 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-1-10). Section 58-1-10 states:
A contract of insurance is an agreement by which the insurer is bound to pay
money or its equivalent or to do some act of value to the insured upon, and as an
indemnity or reimbursement for the destruction, loss, or injury of something in
which the other party has an interest.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-1-10.
186. Blackwelder, 332 N.C. at 322, 420 S.E.2d at 435. Winston-Salem had agreed to
indemnify RAMCO for payments made on the city's behalf. See id
187. See id. at 323,420 S.E.2d at 435.
188. See hL
189. 121 N.C. App. 351,465 S.E.2d 551 (1996).
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Court of Appeals briefly addressed § 160A-485 and local government
risk pools. Wall sued Raleigh, alleging that a debt collector for
Raleigh had violated a statute regulating the conduct of such
collectors." ° Raleigh was a member of a local government risk pool,
Interlocal Risk Financing Fund of North Carolina. 9' The risk pool
indemnified Raleigh for claims up to $2,000,000; however, the City of
Raleigh had to pay a $500,000 deductible on each claim.' Due to the
deductible, the court of appeals held that Raleigh had not waived
governmental immunity by participation in the local government risk
pool for claims of $500,000 or less. 93
The previous discussion has focused on whether and to what
extent a city's participation in a risk-management program amounts
to a waiver of governmental immunity. In some instances, the risk-
management program, involving the use of public funds, may not be a
local government risk pool formed pursuant to the North Carolina
General Statutes.'94 When a city is using public funds, the city's
authority to use the funds in a certain manner is sometimes
challenged. 9 In Leete v. County of Warren,'96 the North Carolina
Supreme Court addressed such an issue. The plaintiffs in Leete
sought an injunction to prevent the Warren County Board of
Commissioners from paying $5000 in severance pay to a county
190. See id at 352, 465 S.E.2d at 552; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-50 to -56 (1994)
(prohibiting debt collectors from engaging in certain acts in the collection of debts).
191. See Wall, 121 N.C. App. at 353, 465 S.E.2d at 553.
192. See id
193. See id at 355, 465 S.E.2d at 554; cf. Jones v. Kearns, 120 N.C. App. 301, 308, 462
S.E.2d 245, 249 (1995) (holding that the City of Winston-Salem had not waived its
immunity for claims up to $250,000 that were not covered by its liability insurance policy).
194. See, e.g., supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing, as an example,
RAMCO in Winston-Salem).
195. Clearly, a city may deposit funds in a local government risk pool in compliance
with § 160A-485 of the North Carolina General Statutes. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-
485 (1994). However, if a city used public funds to form a local government risk pool that
does not meet statutory requirements, the city's authority to use the funds could be
challenged. See Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C. 413, 417, 451 S.E.2d 284, 287
(1994) ("It is a well-established principle that municipalities, as creatures of the state, can
exercise only that power which the legislature has conferred upon them."); Watauga
County Bd. of Educ. v. Town of Boone, 106 N.C. App. 270, 273, 416 S.E.2d 411, 413
(1992) ("A municipality is a creature of the Legislature and it can only exercise (1) the
powers granted in express terms; (2) those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to
the powers expressly granted; and (3) those essential to the accomplishment of the
declared objects of the corporation .... "); cf. Brown v. Commissioners of Richmond
County, 223 N.C. 744, 746, 28 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1943) ("[A] municipality cannot lawfully
make an appropriation of public moneys except to meet a legal and enforceable claim
196. 341 N.C. 116,462 S.E.2d 476 (1995).
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manager after his voluntary resignation.1" After the manager
announced his resignation at a board meeting, the Board authorized
the severance pay.' In holding that the county could not authorize
the severance pay, the supreme court stated that the legislature
cannot "'authorize a municipal corporation to pay a gratuity to an
individual to adjust a claim which the municipality is under no legal
obligation to pay.' ,,9 Furthermore, a municipality may not
appropriate public funds "'except to meet a legal and enforceable
claim, and can make no payment upon a claim which exists merely by
reason of some moral or equitable obligation which a generous, or
even a just, individual, dealing with his own moneys, might recognize
as worthy of some reward.' "" Thus, the court implied that in order
to distribute governmental funds, a local government must have a
legal obligation to pay the receiver 2°" otherwise, the city would be
acting ultra vires.
One of the major issues in Lyles was whether the DIRM formed
by the City, Mecklenburg County, and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education was a statutory local government risk pool.2
The dissent concluded that the DIRM was a local government risk
pool almost by default, stating that the agreement was either a local
government risk pool within the meaning of the statute, or payment
of funds from the DIRM to settle tort claims to which governmental
immunity applies would be ultra vires?' By "presum[ing] that the
City acted pursuant to article 20 of chapter 160A of the North
Carolina General Statutes as recited in the agreement establishing
the risk-management program,"' the dissent essentially presumed
that the City would not act in a manner that might be ultra vires.
However, the City may have thought it had the authority to form a
non-statutory risk-management program. 5
197. See id. at 117,462 S.E.2d at 477.
198. See id. at 117-18,462 S.E.2d at 477.
199. Id. at 120, 462 S.E.2d at 479 (quoting Brown, 223 N.C. at 746, 28 S.E.2d at 105-
06). The legislature may not authorize the payment of gifts or gratuities by a municipality
using public funds. See i.d (citing Brown, 223 N.C. at 746, 28 S.E.2d at 105-06).
200. Id at 120-21,462 S.E.2d at 479 (quoting Brown, 223 N.C. at 746,28 S.E.2d at 105-
06).
201. Cf. Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C. 413, 417, 451 S.E.2d 284, 287 (1994)
("It is a well established principle that municipalities, as creatures of the State, can
exercise only that power which the legislature has conferred upon them.").
202. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 679-80,477 S.E.2d at 153.
203. See id. at 686,477 S.E.2d at 156 (Frye, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Frye, J., dissenting).
205. For example, the supreme court implicitly has approved the City of Winston-
Salem's risk-management program even though it is not a statutory local government risk
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The dissent also made strong policy arguments for classifying the
agreement as a local government risk pool. If the agreement was not
deemed a local government risk pool, then the dissent noted that a
major problem with such "'joint undertaking' contracts ... is that
[they] give[] local governments the unbridled discretion to pay some
claims and to assert governmental immunity as to those claims that it
does not wish to pay."m Under risk-management agreements that
are not statutory local government risk pools, the local government
could decide to settle some claims and not to settle others. However,
if the local government decides not to pay the claim and is sued in
court, it may still raise governmental immunity as a defense. The
dissent disfavored such a prospect of local government officials
making arbitrary decisions about awards to injured parties that were
not reviewable by courts.' Therefore, based on these policy
arguments and the notion that the City's actions would be ultra vires
if not made under statutory authority, the dissent argued that the
agreement was a local government risk pool.2°
One weakness in the dissent's argument is that it did not use the
plain language of the statute.' The dissent maintained that the
agreement was a constructive local government risk pool,210 but did
not use the statute to bolster its position. The dissent could have
expounded on arguments made by Lyles that the agreement fell
within the statutory definition of a local government risk pool.
211
Lyles argued that the essence of a local government risk pool is
"providing for the payment of claims made against a member on a
cooperative or contract basis with one another."2 " Lyles felt that the
pool. See Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem, 332 N.C. 319, 321-22, 420 S.E.2d 432,
434 (1992); see also supra notes 177-88 (discussing Blackwelder).
206. Lyles, 344 N.C. at 684,477 S.E.2d at 155 (Frye, J., dissenting).
207. See id. (Frye, J., dissenting).
20& See id. at 684-86,477 S.E.2d at 155-56 (Frye, J., dissenting).
209. See id (Frye, J., dissenting). Even if an argument for a certain statutory
interpretation is not predicated on plain language, it should at least address the plain
language in order to make the argument more complete. One commentator has noted
that "[e]ven those [United States Supreme Court] opinions that are based on
considerations other than plain language now routinely go through painfully detailed
grammatical analysis." Lawrence M. Solan, Learning our Limits: The Decline of
Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 WiS. L. REV. 235,243; see also, e.g., Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 507 U.S. 170,177-79 (1993) (relying on close grammatical analysis to explicate the
meaning of a statute).
210. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 684,477 S.E.2d at 155 (Frye, J., dissenting).
211. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-23-5 (1994).
212. Lyles, 344 N.C. at 679-80, 477 S.E.2d at 153. This language is nearly verbatim
from § 58-23-5's definition of a local government risk pool. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-23-
5; supra note 173 (quoting § 58-23-5).
[Vol. 76
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
City's agreement met this criterion, because in certain instances, the
City has the right to use money contributed by the other entities to
pay claims."' Lyles argued that "the entities had pooled retention of
their risks for liability claims and provided for the payment of such
claims made against any member of the pool on a cooperative or
contract basis."2 4 Under the agreement, the City was required to
reimburse the other entities for money it borrowed to pay claims that
were between $500,000 and $1,000,000.215 Lyles asserted that, despite
the reimbursement, the agreement was still on a cooperative or
contract basis.216
In countering this argument, the City relied on § 58-23-15 of the
North Carolina General Statutes,2 17 which requires the risk pool
agreement to "contain a provision that the pool pay all claims for
which a member incurs liability., 21 8  The City argued, and the
majority agreed, that the City's agreement did not meet this
requirement because each member was required to reimburse the
risk pool, with interest, for any funds paid on its behalf.29  The
majority essentially grounded its holding in the belief that there is no
sharing of risk when an entity contributes money to a fund wherein
another member can use such money with an obligation to repay it.m
The majority presumably would classify the DIRM as a lender,
similar to a bank, rather than a local government risk pool.
The majority also made two other statutory arguments to
support its determination that the agreement did not constitute a
local government risk pool. First, the statute has certain
requirements for organizing such a risk pool.*' In creating the DIRM
and setting up its procedures, the entities involved did not meet these
statutory requirements.m Second, the majority noted that the
213. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 679,477 S.E.2d at 152..
214. Id at 679,477 S.E.2d at 152-53.
215. See id. at 678,477 S.E.2d at 152; see also supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text
(elaborating on the terms of the agreement). In addition, the funds borrowed had to be
repaid with interest. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 678,477 S.E.2d at 152.
216. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 679-80,477 S.E.2d at 152-53.
217. See id. at 680,477 S.E.2d at 153.
218. Id.; see also supra note 174 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-23-15 (1994)).
219. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 680,477 S.E.2d at 153.
220. See id.
221. See id. For example, the local government must give the Commissioner of
Insurance of North Carolina 30 days' notice before forming such a pool. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-23-5. There are also requirements for adopting operational procedures and
creating boards of trustees. See id. § 58-23-10.
222. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 680-81,477 S.E.2d at 153.
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Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education did not meet the
statutory definition of "local government."'  Unfortunately, the
majority did not determine the effect this shortcoming would have on
deciding whether a local government risk pool existed when the other
statutory requirements of creating a risk pool have been satisfied."'
Nonetheless, the majority in Lyles used statutory text to support its
holding that the City's agreement was not a local government risk
pool.'
However, the majority could have bolstered its decision by
addressing the policy concerns of the dissent. The rule regarding a
city's authority to distribute funds, as stated in Leete, provides the
background for one such policy concern.m In Leete, the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that the Warren County Board of
Commissioners could not authorize a severance payment to a county
manager after his voluntary resignation." The court stated that a
municipality may not appropriate public funds "'except to meet a
legal and enforceable claim.' "" If a claim is not legal and
enforceable or if the legislature has not conferred the power to spend
the funds in a particular manner upon a municipality,=m then a
municipality may not have authority to appropriate the funds.21
Neither party raised the issue of whether the City of Charlotte's
participation in the risk-management program was ultra vires.
22
223. See id. at 680, 477 S.E.2d at 153. A" 'local government' means any county, city,
or housing authority located in [North Carolina]." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-23-1.
224. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 680, 477 S.E.2d at 153. "A local board of education is
immune from suit and may not be liable in a tort action unless the Board has duly waived
its governmental immunity." Hallman v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 124 N.C.
App. 435, 437, 477 S.E.2d 179, 180 (1996) (citing Fields v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 251
N.C. 699, 700-01, 111 S.E.2d 910, 911 (1960); Overcash v. Statesville City Bd. of Educ., 83
N.C. App. 21, 24-25, 348 S.E.2d 524, 527 (1986)). A board of education may waive its
immunity only by purchasing liability insurance. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-42 (1994).
Section 115C-42 "contains no authorization, such as that contained in [N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160A-485], for waiver of immunity by participation in a risk pool." Hallnan, 124 N.C.
App. at 438,477 S.E.2d at 181.
225. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 681,477 S.E.2d at 153.
226. Leete v. County of Warren, 341 N.C. 116,462 S.E.2d 476 (1995).
227. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text (discussing Leele).
228. See Leete, 341 N.C. at 123,462 S.E.2d at 480.
229. Id. at 120,462 S.E.2d at 479 (quoting Brown v. Board of Comm'rs, 223 N.C. 744,
746,28 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1943)).
230. See Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C. 413, 417, 451 S.E.2d 284, 287 (1994)
("It is a well-established principle that municipalities, as creatures of the State, can
exercise only that power which the legislature has conferred upon them.").
231. See id.
232. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 681,477 S.E.2d at 153.
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Therefore, the majority did not address the issue directly 3  The
dissent, however, was concerned about the City's payment of funds to
settle tort claims to which governmental immunity might otherwise
apply.' Unless the City had waived its governmental immunity by
participating in a local government risk pool, the dissent argued that
the payment of funds to settle possible tort claims would be ultra
vires 35
However, while the City's use of funds may be ultra vires in
some situations,. the City could use the funds in ways other than
settling claims to which governmental immunity might apply. For
example, a city may not claim governmental immunity when it is
acting for proprietary reasons with its own benefits at stake.237 In this
situation, when a city is clearly not immune, such a city may want to
negotiate a settlement of the claim. A city also could use the funds to
pay judgments resulting from lawsuits because that city is under a
legal obligation to pay.' Therefore, a city's use of the risk-
management fund is not necessarily ultra vires in all situations.
The majority addressed the ultra vires issue only to the extent
necessary to respond to the dissent."i In its brief discussion, the
majority noted that the legislature provided for the waiver of
sovereign immunity by participation in a local government risk pool
and provided specific requirements to establish such a risk pool. °
The majority "believe[d] it would be a mistake to hold that a local
government may ignore these statutory requirements and create a
233. See id.
234. See id. at 686,477 S.E.2d at 156 (Frye, J., dissenting).
235. See id- (Frye, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that the City must have
intended to form a local government risk pool pursuant to statute, such that its actions
were not ultra vires. See i. (Frye, J., dissenting).
236. The North Carolina courts have not addressed a case in which a plaintiff argued
that a non-statutory risk-management program was ultra vires. A search for such a case
yielded none.
237. See Moffitt v. City of Asheville, 103 N.C. 191,203, 9 S.E. 695, 697 (1889) (stating
that when a city acts in a "ministerial or corporate character in the management of
property for [its] own benefit, or in the exercise of powers, assumed voluntarily for [its]
own advantage," the city is "impliedly liable for damage caused by the negligence of
officers or agents subject to [its] control"); Harper, supra note 18, at 47-49 (discussing
Moffitt and noting that North Carolina courts continue to deny sovereign immunity to
proprietary functions); Gray, supra note 100, at 47-50 (discussing the distinction between
governmental and proprietary functions and the rule that proprietary activities can result
in tort liability).
238. See Leete v. County of Warren, 341 N.C. 116, 120-21, 462 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1995);
see also supra text accompanying note 200 (quoting the relevant portion of Leete).
239. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 681,477 S.E.2d at 153.
240. See id.
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risk pool to its own liking.""24 The majority then held that there was
not sufficient risk-sharing in the agreement for it to be considered a
risk pool.242
Assuming the City was not participating in a local government
risk pool, the agreement might better be classified as "self-
insurance." One authority has defined self-insurance as "'a planned
program of paying from a company's own funds for losses sustained,
where it recognizes reasonably the potential losses that might be
incurred, does all that it can to avoid or reduce this potential, and
then provides a means to process and pay for the losses
remaining.' ,,243 Although the DIRM might be classified as self-
insurance, the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to characterize
a similar program as such in Blackwelder.2
Nonetheless, strong arguments can be made that self-insurance
programs should be a basis for waiver of governmental immunity.
Agreements such as the ones in Blackwelder and Lyles are similar to
traditional insurance policies and both provide adequate funds for
compensation of victims.245 The North Carolina legislature already
has sought to protect victims by abolishing governmental immunity
when a city purchases liability insurance to cover a claim.246 As "[t]he
ideal underlying risk-management is the efficient payment of claims,"
if a local government has sufficient funds in a risk-management
program not amounting to a local government risk pool, "it is the
duty of the local government to protect the interest of the individual
pursuant to section 160A-485."' 7
The other major issue in Lyles was whether the City had waived
its governmental immunity by purchasing liability insurance.24 In
arguing that the City had waived its governmental immunity, Lyles
was in a precarious situation. Because her husband's death occurred
241. Id.
242. See id. at 680, 477 S.E.2d at 153. Another major factor was the required
reimbursement of the fund for any claims paid on a party's behalf. See id.
243. Thomas W. Rynard, The Local Government as Insured or Insurer: Some New
Risk Management Alternatives, 20 URB. LAW. 103, 111 (1988) (quoting Robert L. Young,
Self-Insurance, in RISK MANAGEMENT TODAY: A How-To GUIDE FOR LOCAL
GOVERNMENT 59,60 (Natalie Wasserman & Dean G. Phelus eds., 1985)).
244. See Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem, 332 N.C. 319,322,420 S.E.2d 432,434
(1992); see also supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text (discussing the court's holding
in Blackwelder).
245. See Coffey, supra note 23, at 732.
246. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1994); Coffey, supra note 23, at 732.
247. Coffey, supra note 23, at 732.
248. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 681,477 S.E.2d at 153.
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while in the course and scope of employment, the Workers'
Compensation Act applied.49 To bring a suit in tort against the City,
Lyles had to avoid the exclusive remedy provision of workers'
compensation." Under Woodson v. Rowland ' ' a person may bring a
suit in tort against an employer if she can show the "employer
intentionally engage[d] in misconduct knowing it [was] substantially
certain to cause serious injury or death to employees and an
employee is injured or killed by that misconduct." 2 In order to
avoid having her suit dismissed on grounds of governmental
immunity, Lyles also had to prove that the death of her husband was
covered by the City's liability insurance policy.2 The City's policy
covered accidents and "exclude[d] coverage for 'bodily injury
intentionally caused or aggravated by or at the discretion of the
Insured.' "2 4 Thus, Lyles had to prove that the employer engaged in
intentional misconduct knowing it was substantially certain to cause
serious injury or deathV5 and that the bodily injury was not
intentionally caused or aggravated by the employer. 6
The majority and the dissent disagreed as to whether Lyles could
bring a Woodson claim that would be covered by the City's insurance
policy. In holding that Lyles's claim was excluded by the insurance
policy,' the majority relied on Stox,' 8 which interpreted a similar
exclusion in an insurance policy.'9 The majority stated that under
249. See id. at 681, 477 S.E.2d at 154; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2 (1994) (stating
the general requirements for recovery under the Workers' Compensation Act).
250. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 681, 477 S.E.2d at 154. The Workers' Compensation Act
states that if the employee and the employer meet the requirements of the Act, "then the
rights and remedies herein granted to the employee [and] his dependents.., shall exclude
all other rights and remedies of the employee [and] his dependents ... as against the
employer at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-10.1.
251. 329 N.C. 330,407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).
252. Id. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228; see supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text
(discussing Woodson and the application of its standard in other cases).
253. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 681,477 S.E.2d at 153-54.
254. Id. at 681,477 S.E.2d at 153 (quoting the insurance policy).
255. This proof was necessary to avoid the exclusive remedy provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act. See id. at 681,477 S.E.2d at 154.
256. Lyles needed to prove this in order for the liability policy to cover her husband's
death, such that the City could not plead governmental immunity. See id. at 681, 477
S.E.2d at 153-54.
257. See id. at 682,477 S.E.2d at 154.
258. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stox, 330 N.C. 697, 412 S.E.2d 318
(1992); see supra note 135-48 and accompanying text (discussing Stox).
259. Compare Lyles, 344 N.C. at 678, 477 S.E.2d at 152 (excluding coverage in policy
for "'bodily injury intentionally caused or aggravated by or at the direction of the
Insured'" (quoting the insurance policy)), with Stox, 330 N.C. at 700, 412 S.E.2d at 321
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Stox, "an intentional act is an accident within the meaning of a
homeowner's insurance policy if the injury incurred was not intended
or substantially certain to be the result of the intentional act."' If
this is the correct interpretation of Stox, then the majority's reasoning
is consistent. However, the dissent disagreed with this
characterization of Stox."1
The dissent asserted that Stox would allow most Woodson claims
to be covered by the City's liability insurance policy.z2 The Stox
court characterized the injury in that case as "'the unintended result
of an intentional act' "6 and held that the injury was covered by the
homeowner's insurance policy."' Specifically, the Stox court
concluded that "it is the resulting injury, not merely the volitional act,
which must be intended for [the] exclusion to apply." ' The dissent
characterized the injury in Lyles as an unintended result of an
intentional act and thus argued that the exclusion in the insurance
policy did not apply.26
Even if the policy included Lyles's claim, the dissent still needed
to explain how Lyles could avoid the exclusive remedy provision of
the Workers' Compensation Act. To address this problem, the
dissent recalled the court's application of its Woodson holding267 to
Pendergrass v. Card Care, Inc.8 The Pendergrass court stated that a
plaintiff can avoid the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act if the employer's conduct was "so egregious as to
be tantamount to an intentional tort." 9 The dissent stated there was
(excluding coverage in policy for" 'bodily injury or property damage' "that" 'is expected
or intended by the insured' " (quoting the insurance policy)).
260. Lyles, 344 N.C. at 682, 477 S.E.2d at 154 (citing Stox, 330 N.C. at 709, 412 S.E.2d
at 325).
261. See idA at 686, 477 S.E.2d at 157 (Frye, J., dissenting).
262. See id. at 687,477 S.E.2d at 157 (Frye, J., dissenting).
263. Stox, 330 N.C. at 703, 412 S.E.2d at 322 (quoting the findings of the trial court).
264. See id. at 711,412 S.E.2d at 327.
265. Id. at 703-04,412 S.E.2d at 322.
266. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 688, 477 S.E.2d at 157 (Frye, J., dissenting). The dissent
noted that Lyles did not argue or believe that the City intended to injure or to kill her
husband. See id. (Frye, J., dissenting). The dissent bolstered its interpretation of the
holding in Stox by noting that Chief Justice Mitchell had written the court's unanimous
opinion in that case. See id. at 687, 477 S.E.2d at 157 (Frye, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Mitchell joined the dissenting opinion in Lyles. See id. at 689, 477 S.E.2d at 158 (Frye, J.,
dissenting). Because Chief Justice Mitchell had written the opinion in Stox, the fact that
he agreed with the dissent's interpretation and application of Stox in Lyles adds strength
to the dissent's position.
267. See supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text (discussing Woodson).
268. 333 N.C. 233, 424 S.E.2d 391 (1993); see supra notes 162-67 and accompanying
text (discussing Pendergrass).
269. Pendergrass, 333 N.C. at 239,424 S.E.2d at 395.
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a minute difference between an intentional tort and "'conduct so
egregious as to be tantamount to an intentional tort.' "' Thus, it
concluded, an employer may engage in misconduct knowing that such
misconduct is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death; in
contrast, such misconduct may not be sufficiently intentional to be
excluded from an insurance policy that does not cover "bodily injury
intentionally caused or aggravated by or at the discretion of the
Insured."271
In other words, there is a distinction between engaging in
misconduct with the intent of causing serious injury or death and
engaging in misconduct with knowledge that such misconduct is
substantially certain to cause serious injury or death. Essentially, the
argument was that the use of the words "intentionally caused" in an
insurance policy should be construed narrowly. m According to the
dissent, bodily injury intentionally caused would probably not include
bodily injury substantially certain to be causedY Conduct that is
substantially certain to cause serious injury or death is sufficient to
remove a claim from the exclusivity provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act. 4 Therefore, the dissent believed that a plaintiff
can bring a Woodson claim and still have coverage under a liability
insurance policy that excludes coverage for intentionally caused
injuries. ' The majority disagreed with this distinction and thus held
that by making a Woodson claim, Lyles had removed her claim from
coverage under the City's insurance policy 6
The dissent made a legitimate argument and identified a region
between intent and substantial certainty that probably exists.
However, the distinction between "intentional" and "substantially
certain" would be difficult to apply. Bodily injury that was
intentionally caused would include bodily injury that is knowingly or
purposely caused. It is unclear how substantial certainty may be
distinguished from knowledge or purpose in the context of injury.
The majority made the correct assessment by implying that any
distinction between bodily injury intentionally caused and bodily
270. Lyles, 344 N.C. at 688, 477 S.E.2d at 158 (Frye, J., dissenting) (quoting
Pendergrass, 333 N.C. at 239,424 S.E.2d at 395).
271. Id. at 678,477 S.E.2d at 152 (quoting the City's insurance policy).
272. See id. at 688,477 S.E.2d at 157 (Frye, J., dissenting).
273. See id. at 688, 477 S.E.2d at 157-58 (Frye, J., dissenting).
274. See Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330,340-41,407 S.E.2d 222,228 (1991).
275. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 689,477 S.E.2d at 158 (Frye, J., dissenting).
276. See id. at 682, 477 S.E.2d at 154.
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injury substantially certain to be caused is negligible.2'
Although the City of Charlotte avoided liability in Lyles, a
question remains as to why a city would purchase liability insurance
or participate in a local government risk pool if it will result in a
waiver of governmental immunity. First, there are some claims for
which a government may not plead immunity.28 For example, a city
may not plead immunity from torts committed in the course of
performing a proprietary function.2 Second, cities may purchase
insurance to protect their employees and officials from liability for
tortious performance of their official duties.= As one commentator
has noted, "[t]he promotion of good will between the local
government employer and its employees is not only a virtue but a
necessity in our increasingly litigious society."s' Third, a city may
purchase insurance to cover its governmental actions, despite waiving
immunity, simply to protect the public from harm.' After paying
taxes to a local government, it may seem inequitable for a taxpayer
not to be compensated for an injury resulting from the actions or
omissions of that same local government. Finally, a city may wish to
participate in a risk-management program to protect "government
assets and taxpayer funds from total consumption. '"'  Thus,
legitimate reasons exist for a municipality to participate in a local
277. See id. at 681-82,477 S.E.2d at 153-54.
278. See Harper, supra note 18, at 72.
279. See id In Moffitt v. City of Asheville, 103 N.C. 191, 9 S.E. 695 (1889), the court
held that cities are liable for damage caused by the negligence of their officers or agents
when they are "acting... in their ministerial or corporate character in the management of
property for their own benefit, or in the exercise of powers, assumed voluntarily for their
own advantage." Id at 203, 9 S.E. at 697; see also Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C.
589, 592-93, 184 S.E.2d 239, 241-42 (1971) (reaffirming the position of the court taken in
Moffitt). There are a number of examples of proprietary functions in which a city may
engage. See Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth. v. Stewart, 278 N.C. 227,231, 179 S.E.2d 424,
426 (1971) (holding that a municipal corporation, owning and operating a public airport,
was acting in a proprietary capacity); Bowling v. City of Oxford, 267 N.C. 552, 557, 148
S.E.2d 624, 628 (1966) ("When a municipal corporation operates a system of waterworks
for the sale by it of water for private consumption and use, it is acting in its proprietary or
corporate capacity."); Aaser v. City of Charlotte, 265 N.C. 494, 497, 144 S.E.2d 610, 613
(1965) (holding that a city, operating "an arena for the holding of exhibitions and athletic
events owned ... to produce revenue and for the private advantage of the compact
community," was engaged in a proprietary function); Hare v. Butler, 99 N.C. App. 693,
699, 394 S.E.2d 231, 235 (1990) ("Non-traditional governmental activities such as the
operation of a golf course or an airport are usually characterized as proprietary
functions.").
280. See Harper, supra note 18, at 72.
281. Id.
282 See i.
283. Coffey, supra note 23, at 716.
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government risk pool or to purchase liability insurance. These
reasons overlap to some extent with arguments to abolish
governmental immunity.
Three primary arguments exist for abolishing governmental
immunity. First, cities and counties may purchase liability insurance
against tort claims,' and "[t]he insurance thus purchased establishes
definite limits of liability of the governmental entity and brings
predictability to the area of tort damage awards." Second,
application of the doctrine seems harsh at times. 6 The North
Carolina Supreme Court has recognized this harshness and has been
reluctant to expand its application.m Finally, the theory of
"enterprise liability" supports abolition of governmental immunity,'
because the theory posits that "the costs of governmental torts are
costs of the enterprise of government that should be borne by the
public through insurance premiums." z  Instead of forcing the
unfortunate victim to pay the costs of the injuries caused by the
government, the public should pay those costs because the public
benefits from the government activity.2'
284. See Gray, supra note 100, at 55. Cities and counties are authorized by statute to
purchase insurance. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1994) (cities); id. § 153A-435
(1994) (counties).
285. Gray, supra note 100, at 55.
286. See id.; see also Lindler v. Duplin Bd. of Educ., 108 N.C. App. 757, 761, 425
S.E.2d 465, 468 (1993) (denying recovery based on governmental immunity to a teacher
who fell and fractured one of her lumbar vertebrae on school premises during a
fundraising function for an honorary teachers' sorority); Plemmons v. City of Gastonia, 62
N.C. App. 470, 472-73, 302 S.E.2d 905, 906 (1983) (denying recovery based on
governmental immunity to a minor who fell off gymnasium bleachers and suffered serious
and permanent brain damage).
287. See Gray, supra note 100, at 55; see also Meares v. Commissioners of Wilmington,
31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 61, 70 (1848) (per curiam) (stating that sovereign immunity was
"somewhat harsh in its mildest sense"); Plemmons, 62 N.C. App. at 472,302 S.E.2d at 906
(holding the board of education not liable based on immunity "[w]hile not unmindful that
this interpretation is likely to produce harsh results in many cases"); Casey v. Wake
County, 45 N.C. App. 522, 523, 263 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1980) ("It is, however, the judicial
trend in this State not to expand but resist the application of the government immunity
doctrine.") (note that the Southeastern Reporter contains "restrict" in place of "resist,"
and "governmental" in place of "government").
288. See Gray, supra note 100, at 55.
289. Id.
290. See id. at 56 (citing Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 313,222 S.E.2d 412,419 (1976)).
The North Carolina Supreme Court discussed the "enterprise liability" theory in Smith:
"[S]ince the public purpose involves injury-producing activity, injuries should be
viewed as an activity cost which must be met in the furtherance of public
enterprise; ... it is better to distribute the cost of government caused injuries
among the beneficiaries of government than entirely on the hapless victims;
although the government does not profit from its activities, the taxpayers do, so
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Naturally, there also are several compelling reasons to retain
governmental immunity. First, the doctrine should be retained for
financial reasons.29  A government repeatedly forced to pay claims
against it could go bankrupt if it does not have adequate funds to pay
damages.29 As one commentator noted, "[i]f ... revenues raised by
taxation are diverted to the payment of damage claims caused by
employees' torts, the budgetary process would be disrupted and
important governmental functions would be impaired.''2 3 Separation
of powers is a second argument for retention of governmental
immunity,' because if courts heard tort suits involving the
discretionary acts of local governments, "judgments made by the
legislative branch would be subject to review by the judicial
branch." '295 Finally, local governments are unique because they
engage in activities that private entities would not ordinarily
undertake.26 If not protected by governmental immunity, local
governments would be exposed to substantial risks from these
governmental activities.29' Despite any strength in the arguments for
the taxpayers should bear the cost of governmental tort liability."
Smith, 289 N.C. at 313, 222 S.E.2d at 419 (quoting COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL Ass'N OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY: THE LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND ITS OFFICIALS 17 (Jan. 1975)).
291. See Gray, supra note 100, at 53.
292- See id.
293. Id.; see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at
978 (4th ed. 1971) ("[C]ities cannot carry on their governments if money raised by
taxation for public use is diverted to making good the torts of employees.").
294. See Gray, supra note 100, at 54.
295. Id. This type of judicial review of legislative decision-making is contrary to the
notion of separation of powers required by the constitution. See id. But see William R.
Casto, James Iredell and the American Origins of Judicial Review, 27 CONN. L. REV. 329,
329 (1995) ("Everyone agrees that the Supreme Court has a power of judicial review that
authorizes the Court to pass upon the constitutionality of governmental action and
declare it void."). See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 1-33 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing the establishment of and justifications for judicial
review).
296. See Sides v. Cabarrus Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 287 N.C. 14, 23, 213 S.E.2d 297, 303
(1975) ("[I]t appears that all of the activities held to be governmental functions by this
Court [sic] are those historically performed by the government, and which are not
ordinarily engaged in by private corporations."); Gray, supra note 100, at 54 ("Local
governments undertake activities that private entities would never undertake."). See, e.g.,
Hayes v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 81 S.E.2d 150 (1954) (involving a local government
erecting and maintaining a jail); Hamilton v. Hamlet, 238 N.C. 741, 78 S.E.2d 770 (1953)
(involving a local government installing and maintaining traffic signals).
297. See Gray, supra note 100, at 54. "Fire protection and prevention, law
enforcement, water and air pollution control, flood control, water and soil conservation,
and public health functions are a few examples of activities essential to the public welfare
the performance of which would become extremely onerous if government were held
liable for all resulting harm." Comment, The Role of the Courts in Abolishing
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abolition of governmental immunity, the North Carolina courts will
not likely dispose of the doctrine without legislative support. The
North Carolina Supreme Court has clearly indicated that any
abolition of the doctrine of governmental immunity must come from
the legislature.29
The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently has heard other
cases involving waiver of governmental immunity in the context of
the DIRM created by the City of Charlotte, Mecklenburg County,
and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. Cross v.
Residential Support Services, Inc.'" was decided before the North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision in
Lyles. In a suit brought against Mecklenburg County, the court of
appeals, relying on its decision in Lyles, 31 held that the "County's
participation in this risk-management program operates as a total
waiver of governmental immunity." ' The North Carolina Supreme
Court, upon a petition for discretionary review, remanded Cross to
the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of Lyles.3 3
The court of appeals also has rejected arguments that the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education waived its governmentalimmunity by participating in the DIRM.3 In Hallman v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 05 the court of appeals stated that
"[a] local board of education is immune from suit and may not be
liable in a tort action unless the Board has duly waived its
governmental immunity.... [A] board of education may waive such
immunity by purchasing liability insurance.""' The court of appeals
Governmental Immunity, 1964 DUKE L.J. 888,893-94.
298. See Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem, 332 N.C. 319, 324,420 S.E.2d 432,435
(1992) ("We feel that any change in th[e] doctrine [of governmental immunity] should
come from the General Assembly."); Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 595,
184 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1971) ("[W]e feel that any further modification or the repeal of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the General Assembly, not this
Court.").
299. 123 N.C. App. 616,473 S.E.2d 676 (1996), remanded for reconsideration, 345 N.C.
341,483 S.E.2d 164 (1997).
300. 120 N.C. App. 96, 461 S.E.2d 347 (1995), rev'd, 344 N.C. 676, 477 S.E.2d 150
(1996).
301. Id.
302. Cross, 123 N.C. App. at 622,473 S.E.2d at 680.
303. See Cross v. Residential Support Servs., Inc., 345 N.C. 341,483 S.E.2d 164 (1997).
304. See Pharr v. Worley, 125 N.C. App. 136, 138,479 S.E.2d 32,34 (1997); Hallman v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 124 N.C. App. 435, 438-39, 477 S.E.2d 179, 181
(1996).
305. 124 N.C. App. 435,477 S.E.2d 179 (1996).
306. Id. at 437, 477 S.E.2d at 180 (citations omitted); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-42
(1994) (stating that a board of education may waive its immunity by securing liability
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relied on the supreme court's decision in Lyles to support the same
holding in Pharr v. Worley,m in which it "conclude[d] that the
[Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education] is not and could not be,
a risk pool participant, and has not waived its immunity.""8  The
reasoning in Hallman and Pharr appears to be generally consistent
with the North Carolina Supreme Court's approach to immunity.3
As the supreme court has stated, North Carolina will retain
governmental immunity until the legislature abolishes the doctrine. '
If the doctrine were abolished, local governments would be forced to
purchase insurance or participate in a risk pool.311 The current status
of the doctrine, where immunity exists unless the local government
purchases liability insurance or participates in a local government
risk pool,312 is probably the best position. Local governments are
immune from tort liability unless they take specific actions to waive
their immunity. Under this scheme, the local government has the
option to purchase insurance or participate in a risk pool. The
legislature could resolve situations similar to Lyles and
Blackwelder,3 13 in which the local governments entered non-statutory
risk-management programs, by requiring local government risk-
management programs to comply with statutory requirements. After
all, the legislature has the ultimate authority to decide whether
insurance, and making no reference to participation in a local government risk pool).
307. 125 N.C. App. 136,479 S.E.2d 32 (1997).
308. id. at 138,479 S.E.2d at 34. The court stated: "[T]he Lyles Court held that '[t]he
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education could not join a risk pool pursuant to [§ 58-
23-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes].'" Id. (quoting Lyles, 344 N.C. at 680, 477
S.E.2d at 153); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-23-1 (1994).
309. In Lyles, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that only cities, counties, and
housing authorities could join a local government risk pool pursuant to Article 23,
Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes. See Lyles, 344 N.C. at 680, 477
S.E.2d at 153. In addition, the Lyles court held that the DIRM did not give rise to enough
risk-sharing to create a local government risk pool. See id.
310. See supra note 298 (citing cases in which the court deferred to the legislature to
abolish the doctrine).
311. See Comment, The Role of the Courts in Abolishing Governmental Immunity,
supra note 297, at 898 (noting that the fear of disastrous effects on limited municipal
funds resulting from an abolition of governmental immunity "can be avoided through
commercial insurance and other loss spreading techniques"). Even with this protection,
the local government could be forced to pay damages that exceed any coverage that it
might have. Unlimited liability could lead to serious financial troubles for any local
government. In addition, the abolition of governmental immunity would serve as a
disincentive for small communities to incorporate and provide services to its citizens at
the risk of being found liable for the actions of its employees and agents. Further, local
governments would likely have to raise taxes in order to protect themselves from liability.
312. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1994); supra notes 119-25 and accompanying
text (discussing § 160A-485).
313. See supra notes 177-88 and accompanying text (discussing Blackwelder).
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governmental immunity should be abolished or in what
circumstances it may be waived.
J. JASON LINK
